



It's (not only) the security, stupid?

**NATO and democracy support in EU Southern and Eastern
neighbourhood**

PUBLICATION #27



Funded by the
European Union



NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF
KYIV-MOHYLA ACADEMY



SHAPEDEM-EU Publications

Published by Jagiellonian University. July 2025.

This publication is part of WP6, led by Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB).

Authors/Edited by: Marcin ZubeK

To cite:

ZubeK, Marcin. It's (not only) the security, stupid? NATO and democracy support in EU Southern and Eastern neighbourhood. SHAPEDEM-EU Publications, 2025.

Design: EURICE GmbH

Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

Table of Contents

- Abstract..... 4
- Introduction..... 4
- 1 Discursive practices, behavioural practices and impact 5
 - 1.1 NATO’s involvement in Eastern Neighbourhood 5
 - 1.2 NATO’s involvement in Southern Neighbourhood 7
- 2 NATO and the EU. NATO Parliamentary Assembly 9
- Bibliography 11

Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), despite being established with the primary purpose of ensuring security in Europe, has incorporated democratic principles from the very beginning of its existence. NATO is considered more of a security community based on certain values, including democracy, rather than a purely interest-based international organisation. This contribution aims to map and identify the actions and discursive practices through which NATO has been instrumental in democracy support, specifically in the Southern and Eastern EU neighbourhoods. The analysis concludes that it is mainly the Eastern EU neighbours' democratic orders that have benefited the most, primarily through NATO's programs directed at potential future members. In the South, NATO has mostly supported democracy through discursive practices.

Introduction¹

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been established in 1949, in the post-World War II context, with a main purpose to ensure peaceful relations between its members as well as safeguard them from any military threat, coming especially from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

It started as a collective defence pact with the main aim encapsulated in the famous Lord Ismay's statement: "to keep Soviets out, Americans in, and Germans down" (Schake & Pepe 2019). On the one hand NATO was then created with a clear and down-to-earth mission – providing security – which lies at the very heart of the realistic approach to International Relations (IR). On the other hand, when looking at the preamble to the Washington Treaty, it directly references "principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (NATO 1949) shared by its members, making it more consistent with a constructivist outlook on IR, a form of a "security community" (Williams and Neumann 2000) with common understanding of certain ideas and expectations regarding the role and future of the Alliance.

Nonetheless, throughout the Cold War period, NATO's main concern has been collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic area and deterrence against the Soviet Union. Democracy has not been a very prominent issue, as undemocratic Portugal was one of the founding members, and also undemocratic governments of Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance in the 1950s based on their anti-communist rather than pro-democratic sentiments (van Dijk and Sloan 2020). This internal inconsistency has not been resolved throughout NATO's existence and occasionally was becoming more visible (e.g. due to 2016 attempted coup in Turkey, or the rise of 'illiberal democracies' in Poland and Hungary) and the debate has indeed gained momentum in the late 2010s owing to a number of calls coming from NATO Parliamentary Assembly calling for the Alliance to recommit to its founding principles (e.g. NATO PA Resolution 454). This will however be scrutinised in more detail in further sections of this report. The report proceeds however primarily with the analysis of externally oriented activities aimed at democracy support in the Eastern and Southern EU neighbourhood.

¹ Note: The content of this article was last updated on 30.10.2023.

1 Discursive practices, behavioural practices and impact

The democracy promotion question started to be a more prominent issue in the 1990s. The geostrategic realities have changed dramatically: NATO's main enemy seemed to have been defeated, and a number of post-soviet and post-communist countries decided to pursue democratic reforms. The Alliance's 1991 New Strategic Concept already mentioned that NATO would support democratic institutions beyond its member states, as this would increase transparency, predictability and stability. Although the Concept does not explain in detail how this support would be delivered, some of the documents that follow hint mainly at strengthening democratic control over military forces (NATO 1991) The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), which managed to free themselves from the Soviet rule started to consider membership in the Alliance.

The first wave of this enlargement process has been concluded in 1999, which also resulted with a publication of another Strategic Concept, which directly stipulated that “[n]o European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration”. It therefore linked the membership in the Alliance with democracy and also democratic control over defence forces and enabled a possibility to participate in the 1994 Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which would facilitate a transition of a candidate country towards these (but also others) democracy-related conditions (Moore, Coletta 2017). The 1999 document also directly mentions one of the current EU neighbours – Ukraine. It states that the Alliance supports its “democratic development”. It needs to be mentioned that all the NATO's democracy-related obligations remain rather secondary and do not constitute the main elements of the thus far mentioned Strategic Concepts.

Also in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) concluding statements, the topic of democracy is comparatively mentioned much less often than other issues (Rubinson 2019, 8). This rhetoric does not change in the two subsequent strategic concepts. The 2010 document puts however more emphasis on a possible enlargement (calling it an “open door policy”) of the Alliance with special indication of the Balkan countries as well as indicates a more global outlook. The 2022 concept treats enlargement in the same spirit and also adds authoritarian actors and their ability to influence people through digital means and thus undermine democracy as a direct threat against the Alliance (NATO 2022, 3), albeit the concept is mainly concerned with the democratic well-being of the NATO member states, meaning that it focuses on how to prevent disruptions of democratic order within the Alliance, rather than supporting democracy outside.

It is clear that the Alliance has a greater potential in promoting democracy in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood rather than in the Mediterranean. This is because Eastern Europe does not seem as an “out of area” theatre of NATO's actions and operations and some countries are potential future members. When it comes to the EU's Southern neighbourhood this possibility does not exist. On the other hand, NATO has also been present operationally in this part of EU neighbourhood. The Operation “Unified Protector” over Libya constitutes thus far the most significant NATO's engagement in the area, which was very much focused on protection of civilians by imposing a no-fly zone.

1.1 NATO's involvement in Eastern Neighbourhood

First and foremost, it seems that it is the NATO enlargement that has the greatest potential to provide support for democratic transformation, at least when it comes to European countries. As already mentioned, democracy is one of the main conditions upon which new members can be

accepted. Almost all the post-1991 NATO enlargements were about including post-Soviet/post-communist or post-Yugoslav states such as CEECs, the Baltics, Montenegro and North Macedonia, where the democratic record and the building of democratic institutions was still in the making during the accession process. A very important reservation needs to be made here – each time this process has been coinciding with candidate country’s European Union (EU) membership bid (see Table 1), which apart from political significance would also bring very tangible economic gains. Without a doubt the EU’s ability to influence democratic reforms in the candidate countries has been much stronger than the NATO’s due to the mechanism of conditionality, where compliance with EU norms and rules were rewarded and non-compliance punished (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020). In all the cases thus far (with the recent exception of Finland), NATO membership has been achieved earlier or in the same year as joining the EU.

The collective security offered by NATO can also be considered as an important ‘carrot’, yet the conditionality was to a large extent limited to political commitment on both sides as well as technical issues connected to achieving interoperability of military equipment and personnel training. Lastly there has also been another option of joining the Organisation of Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), but this organisation did not possess any significant “carrots” (did not give security guarantees).

Table 1. NATO and EU accession timelines

Country	EU Accession	NATO Accession
Albania	Candidate	2009
Bulgaria	2007	2004
Croatia	2013	2009
Czechia	2004	1999
Estonia	2004	2004
Hungary	2004	1999
Latvia	2004	2004
Lithuania	2004	2004
Montenegro	Candidate	2017
North Macedonia	Candidate	2020
Poland	2004	1999
Romania	2004	2004
Slovakia	2004	2004
Slovenia	2004	2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Candidate	MAP in 2010
Ukraine	Candidate since 2022	Potential candidate since 2008
Georgia	Candidate since 2022	Potential candidate since 2008

Source: author’s own elaboration

It is therefore unclear to what extent NATO membership bid has been instrumental in fostering democratic reforms in the NATO candidate countries. According to Rubinson (2021), despite a significant amount of democratic discourse in NATO documents and official speeches, the Alliance was unable to sustain democratic reforms in the recently admitted members, as it normalised deviance from democracy and made it subordinate towards achieving political goals.

This was exemplified by the admission of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania which during its accession have been qualified as a partly-free regimes (Rubinson 2019, 4).

As of mid-2023, NATO has established cooperation with all the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, apart from Belarus. Georgia and Ukraine are the only EaP countries which expressed willingness to join the Alliance, which was acknowledged by NATO during the 2008 Bucharest Summit. Despite this green light given by NATO, neither Ukraine, nor Georgia have received the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is conducive towards triggering democratic reforms, as it sets out detailed criteria for membership. These (among others) include:

- Conform[ity] to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty such as democracy, individual liberty and other relevant provisions set out in its Preamble,
- Commitment to the rule of law and human rights,
- Appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces,
- Commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility, (NATO 1999).

Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan are NATO's partners in the (PfP) and contribute to its operations, as well as sign Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP). This extensive network of cooperation is connected with the 2011 principle of flexibility of NATO's partnerships, which favoured those relationships that somehow were able to boost its presence in various theatres of operations, especially in Afghanistan (Larsen 2021). Nonetheless, the Eastern European (and Balkan) countries were still supposed to be within an enhanced partnership scheme, where NATO would still pursue its mid-1990s policy of "transforming former authoritarian regimes into responsive states with security apparatuses supported by stronger democratic governance" (Ibid, 88.).

Lastly, there is the 2022 Russia's aggression on Ukraine and NATO's response. Democracy support has not been at the forefront of Alliance's assistance to Kiev. Already in 2016 NATO and Ukraine agreed on the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), which was mainly about boosting Ukraine's security and defence capabilities. Democracy has only been mentioned in relation to "strengthening democratic oversight, including a strengthened role of Parliament and civil society". In the aftermath of the invasion the CAP instrument has been boosted and transformed into a multiannual program for assistance. It seems that the qualitative change regarding NATO's democracy support should rather be connected with the possibility of Ukraine joining the Alliance, although during the NATO 2023 NATO summit it has been stated that Kiev's aspirations 'moved beyond the need for the Membership Action Plan' (NATO 2023). It is unclear whether it means that Ukraine has already fulfilled the democratic criteria outlined in a MAP, or that these criteria will not fully apply and will be overshadowed by security considerations.

1.2 NATO's involvement in Southern Neighbourhood

When it comes to NATO's involvement in the Southern Neighbourhood, the Alliance's connections are much looser. In 1995 NATO (the same year in which the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was initiated) launched a so-called Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) - a multilateral forum based on "non-discrimination, self-differentiation, two-way engagement, non-imposition, diversity and complementarity to other international initiatives in the region" (NATO 2023). Democracy or

democracy promotion do not feature among the MD's core principles. This cooperation framework is set out to cooperate on issues of mutual interest such as security, stability and political dialogue and does not include any kind of conditionality. As Larsen observes, it is "too vague to be meaningfully understood as democracy support" (Larsen 2019). Indeed, while looking at Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programs, it is difficult (if not impossible) to identify projects contributing to democracy support. They mainly focus on crisis management, terrorism, defence planning and armaments. There is however a number of projects focusing on environmental protection, and some with regard to good governance and battling corruption (e.g. translating the "Compendium of Best Practices. Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence" into Arabic). Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Mauritania are included in the MD scheme.

However, taking into account the so-called 'Arab Spring' and toppling down the Gaddafi regime, it can also be claimed that NATO has also been present in Libya, even though no further partnership was pursued. It would be difficult to claim that NATO's military intervention in Libya in 2011 could be labelled as an effective democracy support, especially taking into account how NATO did not follow up with any activities, which would democratise the country after the dictator's demise. It does not seem that, contrary to the EU case, the 2011 crises in the Mediterranean constituted a critical juncture for NATO regarding its democracy support ambitions. Discursively perhaps there has been certain and temporary shift. During the first months of dramatic events taking place in Egypt and Libya, the statements of NATO's Secretary General Rasmussen were full of democratic rhetoric mentioning "speedy, orderly and peaceful transition to democracy, respecting the legitimate aspirations of the people of Egypt" (NATO 2011a)

He also praised the "people of Libya (...) express[ing] a strong desire for democratic change. Their legitimate aspirations must be addressed. Freedom of expression and assembly are fundamental rights which cannot be denied". Rasmussen continues with the following: "As the Secretary General of an alliance of democracies [my emphasis], I strongly believe that democracy is the only solid basis for long-lasting stability. In the long run, no society can ignore the will of the people, because the desire for freedom resides in every human being" (NATO 2011b)). Finally on 2011 elections in Tunisia, he congratulated people for showing "their firm commitment to freedom and democracy" (NATO 2011c)). Even two years later the echoes of this democratic optimism were still visible in a speech given by Dirk Brengelmann, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy in Morocco, where he stated that "In Libya, for example, all institutions have been systematically wiped out over the last forty years. NATO could help in building a new Ministry of Defence, a joint General Staff and a National Security Agency that would all be accountable to a democratically elected government" (NATO 2013).

The engagement of NATO in Libya through the Unified Protector operation could be perhaps understood as democracy support only in a sense that it freed the country from a long-standing dictator who has failed in protecting the people under his rule. It was a humanitarian intervention launched to protect civilians as individuals, not the Libyan state, which can perhaps be also linked to democratic principles. NATO has however not followed-up. After Kadafi's downfall the country plunged into a civil war and became unstable and unsafe.

This is a clear difference from what NATO did during its interventions in the Balkans (Serbia, Kosovo), and even remote Afghanistan. In the Balkans, NATO is still present as peacekeeping

force in Kosovo and shares its assets with the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina through operation ALTHEA. It therefore managed (although not without pitfalls) to clear those countries from peace spoilers/dictatorship, build (together with other international actors) a stable and potentially democracy-conducive environment and hold it for over two decades. In Afghanistan it was only able to clear and build but not hold. In Libya only the clearing phase has been realised, perhaps due to already overstretched NATO's (and US') capabilities in Afghanistan and Iraq and thus inability to put boots on the ground. One could perhaps state that in Libya NATO has performed somewhat 'negative' democracy support operation in a sense that it dissolved certain barriers (dethroned a long-lasting dictator) for democracy to be built. In the same vein, one could however argue that this is not democracy promotion at all, as it does not necessarily invite a democratic regime, but might as well encourage new authoritarian leaders to take over.

2 NATO and the EU. NATO Parliamentary Assembly

From what has been written it seems that the Eastern Neighbourhood is a far more fertile ground for NATO's democracy support activities. This is also true for the European Union, in this case however the Mediterranean dimension is regarded at least as important as the eastern one. The EU and NATO have been cooperating very closely on numerous issues in the security and defence realm. This cooperation however is not focused on democracy promotion per se, rather it emphasises a common response to global challenges such as countering hybrid threats, boosting resilience or developing new military capabilities (NATO 2016).

Some possibly interesting exceptions here would be a cooperation with the aim to counter disinformation. According to the 2022 Seventh Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common set of Proposals Endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017 (NATO 2017), NATO and EU have been working on a project on "Disinformation in democracies – Improving Societal Resilience to Disinformation". It is not clear whether this project is directed towards the neighbourhood, but further in the report Ukraine and Moldova are mentioned in this context. Moreover, there is common EU and NATO support for the good governance aspect of democracy in both East and South Neighbourhoods e.g., through "NATO Building Integrity" (BI), which is supported through the NATO BI – EU Partnership Agreement, continued to support Georgia, Jordan, the Republic of Moldova, Tunisia and Ukraine in the area of good governance in the defence and security sector".

NATO and EU also are able to collaborate operationally through the Berlin plus mechanism, which was done during the transition of responsibility for conflict transformation in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This cooperation has not been implemented in the EU Southern or Eastern neighbourhood. According to Howorth (2018) the EU is able to act in a "Berlin plus in reverse" way, as it has a certain toolbox at its disposal, which enables it to promote democracy with more civilian, tailor-made tools.

There is one more institutional actor, somewhat within NATO structure that should also be mentioned when it comes to democracy promotion. Namely the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. (NATO PA) Even though it is not legally a part of NATO, but an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI), it is closely aligned with the alliance and, according to its own mission statement, "not just a forum for discussion, but a tangible embodiment of NATO's democratic values" (NATO PAa)). The Assembly consists of 271 delegates from all NATO members, who are delegated by the national parliaments in accordance with national procedures. NATO PA works

through a plenary session and various committees and often adopts policy recommendations for NATO decision-makers, to which the NATO Secretary General provides a written answer.

According to the literature on IPIs, these institutions serve as a way for deliberation, the legitimisation of various policies, and the socialisation of its members. They also have very limited control and scrutinising function (Rocabert et al. 2019). They may however constitute a source of ideas and contestation of how a given international organisation works, as it is the case with e.g. Euronest Parliamentary Assembly – an IPI created by the EU especially for the Eastern Partnership countries (Góra and Zubek 2021).

In this particular case the NATO PA has been strongly concerned with a threat of NATO's departure from the value-based principles. It has even recently called for the establishment of a "Democratic Resilience Centre" within NATO, with a claim that the Alliance "must play its part in protecting and expanding democracy and in strengthening Europe and North America's ability to resist and counter attempts to undermine it" (NATO PAb). The actions undertaken by the Centre are not only meant to be directed outside, but also (and perhaps foremost) should focus on the internal commitment to democracy within NATO member states.

The Centre is intended to function as a central hub and repository of knowledge regarding the best approaches and the exchange of ideas related to challenges to democracy and democratic standards. Its primary goal would be to unify and enhance the various ongoing initiatives within NATO, making them more cohesive and prominent. Participation would be voluntary to member nations, partners, and those seeking NATO membership. This framework would function as a means to collaborate with other organizations on matters concerning the resilience of democracy.

Also, the NATO PA has renamed one of its committees into a Committee on Democracy and Security, which has published reports concerning the external dimension of democracy promotion by NATO in both southern and eastern neighbourhood, such as: *The Russian War On Truth: Defending Allied And Partner Democracies Against The Kremlin's Disinformation Campaigns* (NATO PA 2023), which summarizes and describes Russian attempts to undermine democracy through disinformation and comes up with a number of recommendations for NATO and also allied governments about how to counter Kremlin's activities; *Ten Years After The Arab Uprisings: Democratic Expectations And Disillusions*, in which post-2013 democratic setback are indicated and thus NATO is deemed responsible to engage actively in democracy support in the MENA region, however the opinion is voiced that it should be done with modesty and humility (NATO PA 2021a); *Fostering Democracy And Human Rights In The Black Sea Region*, which interestingly also tackles the democratic performance of two NATO members – Bulgaria and Romania (NATO PA 2018); *Bolstering The Democratic Resilience Of The Alliance Against Disinformation And Propaganda* (NATO PA 2021b), focusing on post-pandemic disinformation and taking stock of what NATO and allied governments have been doing to counter it.

To sum up, on the one hand NATO can be considered as an alliance purely focused on defence and superpowers competing with one another, and, on the other, a security community based on common values, which also strives to promote them outside. Regardless of which perspective we assume, this support has been taking place mainly through NATO enlargement in "areas of special concern", such as "civilian oversight of the military, problems of ethnic and gender discrimination within the ranks, and the manner in which conscripts are treated" (Barany 2009), but also the general level of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights. The intensity

of promoting democracy by NATO has however been uneven in the East and South. This is very much connected with various interests of alliance's partners, but also NATO's capabilities. Whether or not NATO puts the support of democracy, or perhaps 'democratic resilience' in partner countries remains to be seen and is largely dependent on the political will of NATO members and the extent to which it will be met with opposition from NATO's main global competitors.

With regard to what kind of democratic components are supported by NATO, it seems that the effective power to govern is the most prominent one. This particularly refers to keeping the military actors as subordinate to political ones (democratic control over the military). This is also part of the horizontal accountability and parliamentary oversight. It also needs to be mentioned that the democratic elections, civil rights and political participation elements of democracy are also present, but they seem to be functioning mainly in the discursive sphere. Lastly, it needs to be added that this report has not been tackling the activities of individual NATO members and their democracy support or autocracy promotion activities. It is without a doubt that some members of the Alliance (e.g. Turkey, USA or France) are promoting authoritarianism through their foreign policies in certain areas of either southern or eastern neighbourhood, but it would be problematic to claim that this is also part of NATO's contribution.

Bibliography

Barany, Zoltan. 2009. "NATO at Sixty." *Journal of Democracy* 20 (2).

van Dijk Ruud & Sloan Stanley R. 2020 "NATO's inherent dilemma: strategic imperatives vs. value foundations", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 43:6-7, 1014-1038, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1824869.

Góra, Magdalena, and Marcin Zubek. 2021. "Stuck in ENP Purgatory? An Assessment of the EU's External Legitimacy Mechanisms." <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3887428>.

Howorth, Jolyon. 2018. "Strategic Autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation: Threat or Opportunity for Transatlantic Defence Relations?" *Journal of European Integration* 40 (5): 523–37. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.1512268>.

Larsen, Henrik. 2019. "NATO's Democratic Retrenchment; Hegemony After the Return of History."

———. 2021. "NATO in an Illiberal World: The Case for Differentiated Partnerships." *RUSI Journal*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2021.1945486>.

Moore, Rebecca R., Coletta, Damon V. (eds.). 2017. "NATO's return to Europe: engaging Ukraine, Russia, and beyond". Washington, DC : Georgetown University Press.

Rocabert, Jofre, Frank Schimmelfennig, Lorian Crasnic, and Thomas Winzen. 2019. "The Rise of International Parliamentary Institutions: Purpose and Legitimation." *Review of International Organizations* 14 (4): 607–31. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9326-3>.

Rubinson. Eyal. 2019. "The role of democracy and human rights adherence in NATO enlargement decisions". NDC Policy Brief. No. 20. September 2019.

———. 2021. "Flexible Democratic Conditionality? The Role of Democracy and Human Rights Adherence in NATO Enlargement Decisions." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 24 (3): 696–725. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-021-00209-z>.

Schake, Kori., Pepe, Erica. "70 years of NATO: the strength of the past, looking into the future". NDC Policy Brief. No. 9. April 2019.

Schimmelfennig, Frank., Sedelmeier Ulrich. 2020. "The Europeanization of Eastern Europe: the external incentives model revisited", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 27:6, 814–833, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1617333)

Williams, M. C., & Neumann, I. B. 2000. "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity". *Millennium*, 29(2), 357–387. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290020801>.

Documents:

NATO. 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty. Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949.

NATO 1991. Final Communiqué. Press Release M-DPC-2(91)104 104 Issued on 13 Dec. 1991. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23842.htm?selectedLocale=en Accessed 15 Oct. 2023.

NATO. 1999. Press Release NAC-S(99) 066 Issued on 24 Apr. 1999 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?selectedLocale=en. Accessed 15 Jul. 2023.

NATO. 2011a. Press Release (2011) 015 Issued on 11 Feb. 2011. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_70588.htm?selectedLocale=en Accessed 21 Jun. 2023.

NATO. 2011b. Press Release (2011) 019 Issued on 21 Feb. 2011. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_70731.htm?selectedLocale=en Accessed on 22 Jun. 2023.

NATO. 2011c. Press Release (2011) 133 Issued on 24 Oct. 2011. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_79860.htm?selectedLocale=en Accessed 22 Jun. 2023.

NATO. 2013. NATO's Approach to a Rapidly Changing MENA Region", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_99693.htm.

NATO. 2016. Statement on the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Release (2016) 178 Issued on 06 Dec. 2016.

NATO. 2017. Seventh Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common set of Proposals Endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017.

NATO. 2023. Mediterranean Dialogue. 10 Oct. 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52927.htm Accessed 15 Oct. 2023. NATO PAa. <https://www.nato-pa.int/content/why-parliamentary-assembly-nato> Accessed 23 Jun. 2023.

NATO PAb. <https://nato-pa.foleon.com/coordination-centre-on-democracy-resilience/the-case-for-a-centre-for-democratic-resilience-in-nato/democratic-resilience-centre-blueprint> Accessed 23 Jun. 2023.

NATO PA. 2018. Fostering Democracy And Human Rights In The Black Sea Region. Committee on Democracy and Security.

NATO PA. 2021a. Ten Years After The Arab Uprisings: Democratic Expectations And Disillusions. Committee on Democracy and Security.

NATO PA 2021b. Bolstering The Democratic Resilience Of The Alliance Against Disinformation And Propaganda. Committee on Democracy and Security.

NATO PA. 2023. The Russian War On Truth: Defending Allied And Partner Democracies Against The Kremlin's Disinformation Campaigns. Committee on Democracy and Security.