Publications

This report presents a set of policy recommendations for the European Union (EU) to recalibrate its democracy support in its Southern Neighbourhood in three countries: Lebanon, Palestine, and Tunisia. These recommendations are based on extensive qualitative research conducted in three respective countries under the SHAPEDEM-EU project. The findings, detailed in Deliverables D3.2 and D3.3, reveal a disconnect between the EU's stated democratic principles and the perceptions of local actors. Across all three contexts, EU engagement is widely viewed as transactional, inconsistent, and subservient to its own geopolitical interests, particularly migration control and regional stability. This has led to widespread disillusionment, ranging from deep-seated cynicism in Lebanon to bitter disappointment in Tunisia and anger during the genocide in Palestine. This report translates these findings into actionable recommendations aimed at fostering a more effective, legitimate, and locally resonant EU policy.

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the European Union's (EU) democracy support practices in Lebanon, Palestine, and Tunisia, highlighting the challenges, contestations, and impacts identified by local stakeholders through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), interviews, and case studies. By examining these three case studies together, the report sheds light on the nuanced dynamics of EU democracy promotion efforts across different geopolitical and sociopolitical contexts.

This study synthesizes relations between Europe and the Arab world, focusing on the period following Arab Uprisings that started in 2010-11. These Uprisings presented both challenges and opportunities for Euro-Med relations, prompting the EU to re-evaluate and strengthen its engagement with the region. Initiatives like the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity revelated a shift in EU's approach towards a more responsive framework, aligning with the evolving needs and aspirations of Arab societies. However, the study argues that the failure of the Arab Uprisings led the EU to favour its short-term interests of preventing violent radicalization and irregular migration over its declared aim of supporting democracy and human rights in its Southern Neighbourhood. The study shows that while the EU accommodated and concluded agreements with the generally autocratic Arab governments, its relationship with Arab societies, including regional civil society organizations (CSOs) have been tense. This tension, the study shows, is due to EU security first approach; its definition of democracy that focuses on procedural democracy while ignoring issues like social justice; and its biased position and clear double standards when it comes to the question of Palestine and treatment of Palestinians. The study argues that supporting authoritarian regimes might indeed prevent violent attacks and irregular migration due to these authoritarian regimes’ heavy security measures. However socio-economic grievances together with political repression only leads more people, youth in particular, to join violent groups or reach out to smuggling networks to cross the Mediterranean. The EU inaction towards the Israeli genocide in Gaza, moreover, only fuels more violent radicalization among youth in the region. The choices of both the EU and the MENA are not between stabilization and chaos, but rather between investing in short-term stability—what Achrainer and Pace call ‘misperceptions of false stability’—or to seek long-term stability by supporting political and socio-economic reforms in the Mediterranean region, as well as a just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This comparative report is prepared under the framework of the EU-funded Project ‘Rethinking and Reshaping the European Union’s (EU) Democracy Support in its Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods’ (SHAPEDEM-EU) within Work Package 2. The package explores the democracy-related dynamics in the Eastern Neighbourhood over the last decade. The data for the report were collected in 2023-2025 through the collaborative effort of all partners involved in WP2 from: the literature review on local democracy perceptions in the Eastern Neighbourhood, conducted in January-August 2023; online surveys in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, organised in March-July 2023; focus groups in all case study countries, apart from Georgia, in February-September 2024; interviews in Armenia in September 2024; and citizen juries in Ukraine in May 2025. The countries of the region were divided into two groups: Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine as primary case studies, while Belarus, Azerbaijan and Moldova as additional cases. Nonetheless, due to the constantly changing situation in the region, the project team faced challenges conducting fieldwork in some of the countries, which resulted in cancelling focus groups in Georgia, organising online surveys in Moldova instead of Armenia and holding citizen juries only in Ukraine.

This paper critically evaluates the democratic nature of the European Union’s policies in Lebanon through five key policy areas: migration & refugees, security, border management, democracy and trade. It aims to provide a holistic understanding of how EU interventions align with democratic principles and the needs of the Lebanese context. The paper shows how EU policies toward Lebanon are predominantly unilateral, focusing on the interests of the EU with a top-bottom approach that is very short term and punctual. These policies are guided by elite thinking and gives little room to the civil societies and grassroots. Such a situation alienates local actors from local ownership, contribution and development of these issues and the problems around them; as such, this might also contribute to worsen the prevailing inequalities and disparities within and with Lebanon.

This paper critically examines the democratic quality of the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy in Palestine, focusing on security and civil society support. Using the framework of social embeddedness, empowerment and accountability, it assesses whether EU interventions foster genuine democratic practices or reinforce technocratic, externally driven governance. The analysis examines EU policies in the wake of the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks and the subsequent intensification of Israel’s violence on Gaza and the West Bank, highlighting how these events exposed contradictions and critical limitations in the EU’s democracy and security interventions. Findings show that EU security initiatives, such as EUPOL COPPS, prioritise technical capacity-building over inclusive governance, sidelining grassroots actors and reinforcing elite-dominated structures. EU support for civil society disproportionately benefits donor-dependent NGOs, imposing conditions that limit political engagement and marginalise local movements and claims for self-determination. Accountability mechanisms for affected communities are weak, and EU policies often align with external security interests, particularly Israel, rather than Palestinian democratic needs. The paper concludes that meaningful (un)learning requires shifting toward locally embedded, rights-based strategies that empower Palestinian actors, strengthen accountability and promote democratic governance aligned with Palestinian aspirations.

This paper examines the European Union’s (EU) security-related practices in Tunisia, assessing their democratic quality before and after the turning point of President Kais Saied’s July 2021 self-coup. Once framed as a democratic success story, Tunisia’s stalled transition and subsequent authoritarian turn tested the EU’s commitment to linking security cooperation with democratic governance. Looking at democraticness as a combination and variation of social embeddedness, empowerment and accountability, the study evaluates whether EU engagement has fostered democratic oversight or reinforced authoritarian practices. Findings show that initial EU efforts at security sector reform largely strengthened unreformed institutions in Tunisia. After 2021, the EU shifted further toward pragmatic security assistance, with migration control dominating the agenda. The 2023 EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding exemplified this trajectory, directing significant resources to Tunisian authorities while excluding civic actors and overlooking systemic human rights abuses. The analysis highlights a pattern of limited democratic (un)learning: EU practices have remained state-centric, opaque and resistant to recalibration in light of Tunisia’s authoritarian consolidation. Rather than embedding democratic accountability, they prioritised short-term stability and border control.

This paper assesses the democratic nature of EU practices in its foreign policy and security engagement with Armenia, as one of countries of the Eastern partnership. This is done to understand the EU’s ability, capacity and willingness to learn new lessons and un-learn past inefficient practices. The paper starts by providing an overview of the conceptual framework underpinning the analysis and explain how democratic nature or democratic-ness of EU foreign policy engagement is assessed through social embeddedness, social empowerment and social accountability. Next, historic turning points in EU-Armenia relations are identified, including: the failed signing of the Association Agreement in 2013, the adoption of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement in 2017, 2018 Velvet Revolution, and 2020 and 2023 wars in Nagorno Karabakh. These demonstrate how the EU evolved as a security and democracy support actor in the country by expanding its reach beyond state elites and embracing civil society actors and its local knowledge. The analysis concludes that by 2023-2025 the EU has largely improved the democratic nature of its foreign policy action and security work in Armenia, yet with the country’s security sector remaining closely connected to and affected by Russia, there is still a need for further improvement, especially in social empowerment and social accountability.

This paper analyses the extent to which the EU foreign and security policy toward Ukraine reflects its declared objective of supporting democracy, alongside local demand for and perceptions of democratic governance. It also explores whether the EU learns new lessons and un-learns past inefficient practices, identifying the contextual and internal triggers that drive this process. The analysis applies the SHAPEDEM-EU framework, which conceptualises the democratic nature of EU foreign policy as a combination (but also variation) of social embeddedness, social empowerment and social accountability. Key turning points in EU-Ukraine relations are examined, including the Maidan, the Russian annexation of Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014, and the full-scale Russian military aggression in 2022. Findings highlight how the EU has evolved as a security and democracy-support actor towards Ukraine through its collaboration with Ukrainian civil society and government, leveraging local knowledge and responding to geopolitical challenges. The paper concludes that by 2025, the EU and Ukraine are mutually dependent in security matters, and continued EU support for security and democratic transformation, particularly in the rule of law and human rights, relies on local knowledge and remains indispensable for Ukraine’s resilience.

The paper critically examines the European Union’s (EU) democracy support practices in Georgia, focusing on the role of civil society within the country’s European integration process. Against the backdrop of pivotal turning points between 2022 and 2025—including the granting of EU candidate status, the government’s authoritarian turn, and the eruption of mass youth-led protests, the analysis explores how EU engagement has both shaped and been challenged by Georgia’s evolving political landscape. Drawing on the framework of social embeddedness, empowerment and accountability, the study assesses whether the EU’s support for civil society has genuinely reinforced democratic values or instead reproduced top-down, technocratic governance models. Findings indicate that EU support has disproportionately targeted established, donor-dependent civil society organisations (CSOs), often sidelining grassroots movements and failing to reflect local democratic knowledge. Institutions such as the Georgian National Platform, intended to institutionalise civic participation, have become elitist and in some cases complicit in legitimising government-led democratic backsliding. The EU’s decision to grant candidate status despite Georgia’s failure to meet most conditions revealed the erosion of conditionality as a key democracy promotion tool, emboldening authoritarian practices and weakening civil society’s watchdog role. By contrast, the nationwide protests of 2024–2025, driven largely by youth and independent activists, demonstrated the emergence of a new civic force outside traditional CSOs structures. These movements highlight both the shortcomings of EU strategies and the need for epistemic unlearning of entrenched donor-centric approaches. The paper concludes that meaningful EU support for democracy in Georgia requires shifting from technocratic partnerships with established NGOs toward engagement with dynamic, grassroots actors capable of sustaining democratic accountability and resilience.

Deliverable 7.5 “Report on the 3 Living Labs” details the implementation and results of the SHAPEDEM-EU project's Living Labs within the Work Package 7 – Academic Synthesis and Policy Recommendations. This innovative method for enhancing democracy support is a critical component of the project's Democracy Learning Loop. The Living Labs utilise a participatory action research methodology to analyse and reshape EU Democracy Support in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods. The method is built on a phased approach that systematically gathers insights and fosters collaboration among a wide range of participants. Through this structured process, the Living Labs brought together voices from EU institutions, civil society organizations, and local actors from the Neighbourhoods for a constructive dialogue. The activities, led by Justus Liebig University (JLU) in collaboration with Carnegie Europe Foundation (CEF), the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF), and the Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM), were conducted between October 2023 and November 2024. The report details the methodology, the process of the task implementation, and the key findings derived from this joint effort within the SHAPEDEM-EU project.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups launched fatal attacks in southern Israel. Since then, the Israeli military has conducted relentless operations in Gaza, killing and injuring tens of thousands of Palestinians. This has brought the “Palestine question” back onto the agenda. Inner-EU differences – between EU institutions as well as among EU member states – have become increasingly apparent, and an unprecedented Palestinian solidarity movement has emerged within Europe. October 7 had the potential to become a turning point for EU-Palestine relations, including in the field of democracy support. Against this backdrop, this paper traces discursive practices on EU democracy support since October 7 in a context of lacking functioning statehood and democratic institutions in Palestine, and of ongoing violence during the studied period of reflection. Accordingly, not many discursive practices on EU democracy support in a narrow sense could be observed; therefore, the study analyses “framework conditions for democracy” as well as the “democratic-ness” of EU practices, extending the scope to EU discourses on Israel. The article consists of four parts. Firstly, it outlines the general background of the case study to contextualise developments and narratives since October 7. Secondly, it maps relevant actors and works out the general contours of their narratives. Thirdly, it analyses some important sub-aspects of narratives. Lastly, it provides concluding remarks. This study combines in-depth qualitative analysis of written sources (EU documents, statements, speeches, press releases, policy briefs, etc.) with semi-directive interviews with EU officials and actors contesting EU narratives.

This paper investigates the narratives of contestation of the European Union’s democracy support practices in Tunisia, focusing on perspectives from both insiders and outsiders within the EU. The study covers thirteen motions for resolution in the European Parliament, six parliamentary debates, and more than forty articles and op-eds produced by human rights organizations, news outlets and think tanks. The timeframe spans from 2021, following Kais Saïed’s power grab, to 2023, in the aftermath of the EU–Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The paper relies on qualitative discourse analysis and identifies two distinct narrative frameworks. The first, labelled as incremental narrative of contestation, calls for a refinement and intensification of EU democracy support to halt further democratic backsliding. The second frames the EU itself as partly responsible for Tunisia’s democratic regression, criticising its policies for failing to deliver the expected positive impact on the country’s democratic standards. The findings show that while progressive contestations have shifted from framing Saïed as the primary “villain” to increasingly holding the EU accountable, it is pragmatic narratives that prevail in EU decision-making spaces and shape external action. The EU’s stance has shifted decisively toward pragmatism, prioritising security imperatives and regime stability over democracy promotion – a trend epitomised by the MoU. Rather than triggering a reassessment of democracy support, this period reinforced the perception of democracy promotion as ineffective in advancing EU strategic goals, which are now pursued through realpolitik-oriented engagement. This recalibration, driven by conservative forces and reinforced by member-state leadership, has marginalised civil society voices, raising fundamental questions about the actual influence of contestation in shaping EU external governance.

Since the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in 1995, democracy support has been a pillar of the relationship between the EU and Lebanon. In 2006, with the entry into force of the EU-Lebanon Association Agreement (signed in 2002), the country became a target of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which insists on supporting “human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Lebanon” through the establishment of independent public institutions and a focus on fighting corruption. Despite the strong discursive emphasis put on the EU’s role in democracy support to Lebanon since the launch of the ENP, the European Union has been criticized for both its objectives and modus operandi. This paper seeks to trace the discursive contestation of EU democracy support practices in Lebanon, with a focus on voices that come from within the EU, both among insiders and outsiders to European policymaking, taking as a conceptual reference the Working Paper on Democracy Learning Loop Concept, developed in the framework of the Horizon Europe project SHAPEDEM-EU (Achrainer and Pace 2024). First, the paper provides an overview of who speaks about Lebanon in Europe, both inside and outside the EU institutions. Second, it maps the contestation of EU democracy support practices, considering whether discursive change has coincided with three phases of European engagement: post-2005; post-2011; post-2019. Based on the works of Jones and McBeth (2010) and Stone (2012) on narratives in the political and policy spheres, the paper identifies two main clusters of narratives into which to categorise different specific types of contestations, based on the different identification of the EU as the ‘problem’ (villain) and/or the ‘solution’ (hero). To do this, the paper is based on the qualitative discourse analysis of twenty-nine motions for resolution in the European Parliament between 2005 and 2024, and eight in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in October and November 2024. The data is further enriched by open-source information on EU democracy support to Lebanon.

This paper examines how European actors contest and reinterpret the European Union’s democracy support in Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine across pivotal political turning points: Georgia’s candidate status and electoral crises (2022–2024), Armenia’s trajectory from the 2013 Association Agreement reversal through the Velvet Revolution to the post-Karabakh crisis (2017–2025), and Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests and the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion. Across the cases, the EU emerges as both a cautious supporter and an uneven enforcer of democratic conditionality, while local civil societies appear as democratic drivers, ruling elites as obstacles, and Russia as the external antagonist. When conditionality is inconsistently applied, as in Georgia, the Union undermines its credibility; when external threats reveal the limits of Russian influence, as in Armenia and Ukraine, the EU shows greater capacity for adaptation and decisive action. The findings demonstrate that contestation within the EU shapes democracy support in uneven ways: discourse often signals learning and adjustment, yet practice remains constrained by geopolitical calculations and entrenched approaches. The analysis underscores the EU’s ambivalence between strategic pragmatism and normative commitments, raising the broader question of whether it can unlearn ineffective patterns and act as a genuine promoter of democracy in its eastern neighbourhood.

Although not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, commitment to democracy has swiftly emerged as a key priority in the UN’s normative agenda, as highlighted in foundational documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Through its various agencies, the UN has also developed a wide toolbox to support democratic institutions at the country level. This paper identifies three core methods employed by the UN and its agencies to foster democratic and institutional resilience: electoral assistance, capacity-building, and the declaration and codification of legal norm. By analysing the effectiveness of these tools in supporting democracy across the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, this paper argues that the UN’s capacity to act is hindered by the guidelines and limitations imposed by its member states – many of which are authoritarian regimes. Additionally, the UN does not operate in a vacuum; rather, it reflects broader geopolitical dynamics. These may weaken its role as a credible democracy support actor as evidenced in several countries in the EU’s Neighbourhood such as Belarus and Tunisia.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), despite being established with the primary purpose of ensuring security in Europe, has incorporated democratic principles from the very beginning of its existence. NATO is considered more of a security community based on certain values, including democracy, rather than a purely interest-based international organisation. This contribution aims to map and identify the actions and discursive practices through which NATO has been instrumental in democracy support, specifically in the Southern and Eastern EU neighbourhoods. The analysis concludes that it is mainly the Eastern EU neighbours' democratic orders that have benefited the most, primarily through NATO’s programs directed at potential future members. In the South, NATO has mostly supported democracy through discursive practices.

The Council of Europe (CoE) is a pivotal regional organisation dedicated to promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Europe. Established post-World War II, the CoE has expanded to include 46 member states, encompassing many former Soviet republics. Its primary mechanisms for democracy support involve exporting norms through standard-setting and legal interpretations, rather than direct policy impact. The CoE's influence is particularly evident in its Eastern Neighbourhood, where member states are bound by treaty obligations, unlike the Southern Neighbourhood, where engagement is voluntary. The CoE's discursive practices vary significantly between the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods. In the East, the CoE frequently addresses democratic developments, as seen in responses to events in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. In contrast, the Southern Neighbourhood receives less attention, with notable engagement only during the Arab Spring and subsequent democratic backsliding in countries like Tunisia. The CoE's behavioural practices, such as National Action Plans and election observations, are more consistent across both regions, focusing on legal and policy expertise. The CoE's relationship with the EU is marked by extensive cooperation, particularly through joint programs like the Partnership for Good Governance and the Southern Programme. These initiatives aim to promote democratic values and human rights, with the EU providing significant financial support. However, the CoE's more inclusive approach sometimes leads to cooperation with non-democratic regimes, raising concerns about legitimising autocratic tendencies. In addressing cross-cutting issues like gender equality and digital transformations, the CoE's conventions, such as the Istanbul Convention on violence against women and the Budapest Convention on cybercrime, offer frameworks for legal and policy reforms. These conventions, while voluntary, become legally binding upon ratification and entry into force, influencing democratic practices in member states. Overall, the CoE plays a unique role in democracy support, leveraging its legal expertise and standard-setting capabilities. However, its cooperation with non-democratic states and the lack of clear distinctions from the EU's policies present challenges. The CoE's future direction, especially in the Southern Neighbourhood, remains uncertain, but its commitment to democracy support is evident in its ongoing efforts and the recent Reykjavik Summit.

This case study explores the African Union’s (AU) evolving role in democracy support, particularly in response to regime changes in the EU Southern Neighbourhood. While the AU has developed a robust normative framework – including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and the principle of non-indifference – its practical application has been inconsistent. Through an analysis of the AU’s responses to the 2011 and 2019 uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, the study reveals a pattern of selective enforcement shaped by internal divisions, external pressures, and a prioritisation of stability over democratic principles. Despite its formal commitment to constitutionalism and anti-coup norms, the AU often deviates from its own standards, raising questions about its credibility and the effectiveness of its democracy support mechanisms.

This case study examines the role of the League of Arab States (LAS) in the EU Southern Neighbourhood, particularly in the realms of democracy and autocracy support. While the LAS has developed instruments and discourses aligned with democratic principles – such as election observation, human rights charters, and governance reforms – its actions often reflect symbolic gestures rather than substantive commitments. The 2011 Arab uprisings serve as a pivotal moment to assess the League’s dual approach: proactive and interventionist in Libya and Syria under the guise of humanitarianism and democracy, yet passive or complicit in Bahrain and Yemen, aligning with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) interests to suppress democratic movements. The study argues that the LAS’s engagement is shaped less by normative commitments to democracy and more by the strategic interests of dominant member states, particularly GCC monarchies. Ultimately, the League’s actions reveal a pattern of authoritarian collaboration masked by pro-democracy rhetoric, aimed at regime survival and regional stability rather than genuine democratic transformation.

This paper examines the evolution and divergence of U.S. democracy promotion efforts in the European Union’s Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods between 2011 and 2022. It argues that while democracy promotion has featured prominently in U.S. foreign policy discourse, its practical application has been uneven and deeply shaped by geostrategic priorities. In the Eastern Neighbourhood, particularly in Ukraine and Georgia, U.S. support for democratic reforms has often aligned with broader geopolitical objectives – namely, the integration of these countries into Euro-Atlantic structures. In contrast, in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), democracy promotion has consistently clashed with entrenched U.S. security and alliance interests, leading to a pattern of rhetorical commitment but limited and inconsistent practice. Despite brief moments of renewed emphasis, such as during the early 2000s Freedom Agenda and in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, U.S. policy in the MENA has largely reverted to supporting authoritarian stability over democratic transition. By comparing U.S. strategies in Ukraine and Georgia with those in the broader MENA region, the paper highlights the central role of geostrategy in shaping the limits and contradictions of American democracy promotion.

This contribution aims at uncovering practices used by the United Kingdom (UK) to support democracy in EU’s Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods. The UK has actively employed its external policy to promote democracy in EU‘s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods. This has been influenced by its colonial history, internal democratic traditions, strategic interests, and also its relations with the EU, especially in the context of Brexit. In the South, particularly in the MENA region, the UK’s engagement intensified after the 2011 Arab uprisings, balancing support for democratic movements with maintaining strategic partnerships with some of the authoritarian regimes for the sake of stability and security. In the Eastern Neighbourhood, the UK’s influence has been shaped by historical relationships with Russia, its role in supporting EU policies, and post-Brexit ambitions. The UK prioritizes democracy support mainly in Belarus and Ukraine, emphasizing human rights, media independence, anti-corruption, and parliamentary capacity-building.

This paper analyses Turkey’s influence as a non-EU external actor in political dynamics in the European Union’s Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods. It assesses Ankara’s discourses, behaviours, and tools as well as the impact on democracy promotion and authoritarian consolidation in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, North Africa and the Middle East. It examines how Turkey’s foreign policy evolved from an initial emphasis on soft power and democratic inspiration—particularly in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings—to a more security-driven and interest-based approach amid its own democratic backsliding. The study shows how Turkey’s influence has been shaped by domestic political developments, ideological affinities, security concerns, and shifting regional alliances. It draws comparisons between Turkey’s engagement in the Southern Neighbourhood, where ideological and civilisational narratives were more prominent, and the Eastern Neighbourhood, where Turkey prioritised sovereignty and stability. It also maps the instruments Turkey uses—diplomacy, military presence, cultural diplomacy, and development cooperation—and the constraints posed by other actors and internal vulnerabilities.

This paper examines Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in the Mediterranean and broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region between 2010 and 2021, highlighting its counter-revolutionary stance and support for autocratic regimes. Traditionally characterised by a status quo-oriented foreign policy aimed at preserving regime stability and the legitimacy of the Al-Saud monarchy, Saudi Arabia adopted a more assertive and proactive regional role during this period. This shift was driven by a combination of regional instability following the Arab uprisings, the relative decline of key regional powers, perceptions of U.S. disengagement, concerns over Iran’s regional influence—especially after the 2015 JCPOA—and the availability of financial resources due to oil booms. Leadership changes in Saudi Arabia further intensified its regional activism, particularly under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who pursued a more aggressive stance against Iran and political Islam, notably the Muslim Brotherhood. The paper explores the Saudi approach by applying the theoretical framework and definitions developed by Achrainer and Pace’s Concept Manual (2024) for SHAPEDEM-EU project. First, the paper looks at how Saudi Arabia conceptualises its foreign policy, to see what ideas and norms are promoted and what is their relationship with democracy. Then, it focuses on the tools employed by the Saudi regime in the countries of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean in terms of autocracy support and its nuances. Lastly, it reflects on the EU’s relationship with Saudi Arabia in its completing role of democracy support in the same region.

This case study explores the multifaceted ways in which Russia exerts autocratic effects abroad, with a particular focus on the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods of the European Union. While Russia does not explicitly promote autocracy as a normative project, its firmly established authoritarian regime influences neighbouring and strategically important regions through a diverse set of mechanisms. The study outlines four dimensions of this influence: (1) autocracy support, where Russia safeguards embattled autocratic regimes (e.g., Belarus, Kazakhstan, Syria); (2) democracy resistance, leveraging economic, security, and subversive tools—including disinformation, secessionist conflicts, and military intervention—to undermine democratic transitions (e.g., Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova); (3) autocracy promotion by example, wherein Russia’s governance model, legal restrictions on civil society, and promotion of traditionalist values are emulated by other regimes; and (4) autocracy promotion through regionalism, via Russia-led organisations such as the CSTO, EAEU, and CIS, which reinforce authoritarian stability through legitimisation, legal harmonisation, and discursive coordination. Drawing primarily on developments from 2010–2021, with contextual references to earlier and later events, the study highlights the behavioural and discursive instruments Russia employs to undermine democratisation and maintain authoritarian influence. It argues that Russia’s actions have not only contributed to democratic backsliding within its immediate vicinity but also pose a structural challenge to EU democracy support strategies. The paper concludes that addressing these autocratic effects requires the EU to recalibrate its democracy support by integrating counter-autocracy measures across policy domains, enhancing resilience to authoritarian regionalism, and promoting alternative democratic regional networks.

This working paper examines China's role in political developments across the EU's Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods between 2010 and 2024, assessing whether Beijing has contributed to processes of democratisation or authoritarianisation. Through detailed analysis of four cases in the Southern Neighbourhood affected by the 2011 Arab uprisings (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria) and three cases in the Eastern Neighbourhood (Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia), two of them linked to the Colour Revolutions, we challenge prevailing assumptions about China as a systematic promoter of autocracy. Instead, we find that China adopts a pragmatic, case-by-case approach to political developments, prioritising stability and continuity over ideological alignment. China's primary tools—official discourse, UN Security Council veto power, and economic engagement—serve to protect commercial interests, international status, and geopolitical considerations rather than to explicitly advance authoritarian agendas. While Beijing has provided discursive support to both democratic transitions and authoritarian consolidation, accommodating whichever political trajectory emerges, substantial material support for autocratic survival remains limited. Syria’s civil war represents the main exception, where China's UN vetoes constituted a significant example of autocracy support, though this was motivated by broader sovereignty concerns and regime change precedents rather than specific support for the al-Assad regime. The study concludes that China's primary challenge to democratisation efforts lies not in active autocracy promotion, but in legitimising authoritarian alternatives through its development model and contesting liberal democratic norms within international discourse.

In theory, EU democracy support should have a greater chance for engaging with its immediate Eastern Neighbourhood due to persuasive practices of democratic diffusion. However, to date the EU’s record in the region has been mired with controversy, lending both the concept and practice of democracy support to greater scrutiny. The report explores new ideas on supporting democracy practices by domestic actors and the EU in two countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, Ukraine and Belarus. Being at different stages of their democratisation journeys and on different trajectories of cooperation with the EU, with Ukraine being a candidate for EU membership since 2022, and Belarus remaining under extensive sanctions since the fraudulent presidential elections in 2020, the two countries offer ample opportunities for the exploration of democracy learning loop in practice. Based on the analysis of secondary and primary data, conducted by the Working Package 2 Team, led by P12-the University of Warwick, in collaboration with Work Package 7 and Work Package 4, that contributed to the task empirically and conceptually respectively, we have identified four ideas for new solutions to the challenges of democratic practices, faced by the Eastern Neighbourhood countries and EU Democracy Support (DS) in the region. These ideas call on the EU and its local counterparts to: 1) differentiate between DS aimed at state institutions and civil society; 2) create opportunities for engagement with all local communities of practice, without prejudice and assumptions as to what these communities are; 3) be open to learning about key values, underpinning democratic practices of all stakeholders involved; and 4) embrace self-governance as a key democratic practice in the studied countries and the region.

The report on the Gender Equality Fellowships provides an in-depth overview of a core activity aiming to implement SHAPEDEM-EU’s cross-cutting theme of gender equality. From Winter 2023 to Spring 2024, the SHAPEDEM-EU project hosted 6 one-month Gender Equality Fellowships (GEFs) in Brussels, Belgium to enable six individuals to meet with stakeholders in Brussels from EU institutions and civil-society organisations. The task was led by the Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, together with Carnegie Europe, Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum and the al-Kawakabi Democracy Transition Center. The GEFs conducted their fellowships from a working desk at Carnegie Europe, through which they were able to meet with stakeholders, research EU policies and approaches to gender equality in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods. The fellows were compensated via scholarships funded by an in-kind contribution of the Justus-Liebig-University Giessen. At the conclusion of their fellowships, the GEFs each submitted individual country reports on the conditions and circumstances of gender equality in the countries of Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Lebanon, Palestine and Tunisia in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood. The individual country reports and policy recommendations are available for download on the SHAPEDEM-EU website (Publications).

This working paper analyses the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in four selected European Union Member States (EUMS) which provide democracy support in the EU’s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods. We presuppose that CSOs are one of the key actors in this process. This working paper is anchored in the concept of embedded democracy (Merkel, 2004; Merkel & Kneip, 2018). We focus on the activities of CSOs in France, Italy, Sweden and Poland. This selection aims to represent EUMS’ different geopolitical interests and varying lengths of EU membership. We assume that these two factors affect the priorities of CSOs regarding the geographical focus and substantive content of their activities. CSOs in selected EUMS differ in their objectives, missions, financial independence and autonomy levels. However, their involvement raises important questions about the role of CSOs in democracy support practices. In line with the SHAPEDEM-EU approach, we assume that CSOs as political actors also constitute local Communities of Practices (CoP). Hence, our research aims to contribute to understanding local democracy practices and discourses related to CSO activities. On the one hand, we observed that many CSOs can positively contribute to democracy, stability, and justice. On the other hand, however, they might – often unintentionally – contribute to instability in partner countries. Some CSOs also promote non-democratic or illiberal values. Based on political development in the EU’s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods, we observe the limited impact of civil society on democratisation in some partner countries. This poses a question about CSOs’ ability to assist in implementing democratic change. This paper also investigates how a different model of CSO funding impacts their activities and, ultimately, their role in the overall democratic support of the EUMS in the EU’s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods.

The EU’s 2020-2024 Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, in its third iteration under the 2012 Strategic Framework, marks a renewed commitment to democracy as a stand-alone issue and introduces several new priority areas. However, it lacks clear guidelines for the implementation of its objectives, including specific timelines and designated responsibilities. Crucially, the Action Plan has struggled to adapt to rapidly evolving global dynamics, including full-scale conflicts that challenge the EU's core democratic values. The decision to extend the Action Plan till 2027, so that it aligns with the Multiannual Financial Framework, delays the prospect of major qualitative improvement to European democracy support. This policy brief critically assesses the 2020-2024 Action Plan and its Mid-Term Review, examining the implications of their design and implementation. It provides insights to inform the development of future policies in democracy and human rights, linking those with SHAPEDEM-EU approaches.

As the EU accelerates the process of adding new member states, it also needs to rethink the relationship between enlargement and democracy. The union should develop a “Copenhagen plus” approach to encourage more comprehensive democratic reforms in candidate countries.

This article addresses the puzzle of why the European Union (EU) struggles to learn from ineffective attempts to support democratization in the Arab world but instead continuously (re-)produces democracy support malpractices. To better understand this phenomenon, we draw from practice theory and conceptualize EU democracy support as practices performed by a community of insiders who act within a complex constellation of communities of practice. Due to the way in which communities function, decision-makers do not critically reflect on the background knowledge on which they base their practices and thus do not learn how to improve them. This constellation model offers a unique take on non-learning within the EU and in (policy-making) groups more generally. We illustrate the proposed conceptual framework through an empirical analysis of EU democracy support in Egypt, showing that the EU performs practices similar to those before the 2011 Revolution due to its inability to learn.

The EU’s failure to leverage strict conditionality emboldened Georgia’s government to pursue regressive policies. Ongoing protests should prompt Brussels to empower Georgian grassroots as catalysts for democratic change.

This Paper gives insights in the projects integrated analytical design and its implementation in three phases as well as two additional perspectives which SHAPEDEM-EU perceives to be of focal relevance to both democratisation and autocratisation. It concludes with an outlook on the expected impact of the project on society, policy and science.

The SHAPEDEM-EU Concept Manual represents the project’s common understandings of its essential terms. SHAPEDEM-EU’s goal is to rethink, reshape and review the EU’s support for democratic politics in its Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods. The diverse and multi-perspective constellation of SHAPEDEM-EU’s partners, objectives and activities require a unified set of concepts to contextualise the ongoing work. Over the course of the project’s first 8 months, its partners collaborated to define the concepts listed in the manual. It serves as a guidance for users to familiarise themselves with how SHAPEDEM-EU perceives democracy support and its related concepts.

Through a bird’s eye view of thirty years of EU democracy support, highlighting the controversies in its pursuit as well asits endurance as a foreign policy goal, this paper explores the under-researched question of how democratic contestation inside the EU and its member states influences EU foreign policy and democracy support.

This report is the first in a series of articles investigating the role of 12 non-EU external actors in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods. These actors include the African Union, the Arab League, China, the Council of Europe, the Norh Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Nations, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Conducted within the framework of SHAPEDEM-EU Project, this mapping exercise aims at providing a better understanding of these actors’ discursive and behavioural practices in the realms of democracy support, democracy prevention, autocracy support and autocracy promotion in both neighbourhoods. As defined in the SHAPEDEM-EU Concepts Manual practices refer to socially meaningful performed patterns of action that represent and impact knowledge, discourse and activities in and on the real world. Practices can be distinguished “between discursive practices (e.g., essential narratives) and behavioural practices (e.g., activities in a specific field of practices)” (Achrainer and Pace, 2024, p. 24). The edition presents a concise overview of the main findings gleaned from the twelve case studies.

The paper discusses the juxtaposition of digital transformation (DT) and democracy support and democracy contestation. While the DT is defined as an adaptation and implementation of digital technologies into political and social processes, digital tools are seen as such that could be used both by democratic and non-democratic systems and are perceived as ‘neutral’. The paper aims to reveal how digital transformation in governance, public services, civic engagement, and more broadly in everyday social practices impacts democracies and democracy support. The digital transformation instruments are reviewed in the context of democracy support and democracy contestation and the conceptual framework for understanding of the role of DT as a cross-cutting issue in the SHAPEDEM-EU work packages is provided. The paper sets the ontological framework for the nexus of DT and democracy support or contestation. It discusses digital democracy and digital authoritarianism first on a conceptual level and then through the analysis of digital instruments and solutions. While they are sorted into two toolboxes – democratic and autocratic – almost all of them could be applied equally to enhance democratic support or to contest democracy and both to facilitate and to circumvent democratic practices and rights. Also, the interconnection of two cross-cutting issues of the SHAPEDEM-EU project: gender equality and DT, is outlined. Finally, the paper reviews EU policies concerning DT and the question of media literacy and its relation to democracy support and democracy learning.

The clandestine standoff between Belarusians and Lukashenka’s regime continues. To ensure regional and global security, the EU needs a coherent strategy in support of the Belarusian people.

Brussels is overlooking Egypt’s lack of democratic reforms to secure Cairo’s cooperation in other fields. This short-sighted approach is emboldening the regime and hurting Egyptian civil society.